Transparency

Warrant canary

A dated statement about government demands for ReverseRef case information. The plain-text statement is signed so anyone can check that it came from the same operator and has not been altered.

Affirmed
September 24, 2026
Next review by
December 15, 2026
Signing format
Minisign

Signed statement

Read the exact text that was signed.

ReverseRef Warrant Canary

Affirmed: 2026-09-24
Next scheduled review: 2026-12-15
Canonical page: https://reverseref.com/canary

As of the affirmation date:

1. ReverseRef has received no subpoena, warrant, court order, National Security Letter, FISA order, or other compulsory government demand for candidate, participant, or case information.

2. ReverseRef has received no such demand accompanied by a nondisclosure or gag requirement.

3. ReverseRef has not disclosed candidate, participant, or case information to a government or law enforcement authority.

4. ReverseRef has not been required to provide bulk or ongoing access, install surveillance capability, create a backdoor, or weaken its privacy or security safeguards.

Scope and limits

This statement covers the ReverseRef operator and the ReverseRef service. It does not cover a service provider's independent legal obligations or actions that ReverseRef does not know about.

If a statement can no longer truthfully be made, ReverseRef intends to remove or revise it when legally permitted. A missing, changed, or overdue update may have explanations other than a government demand. This canary is a transparency signal, not a legal guarantee.

This file is signed with the ReverseRef Minisign key published at:
https://reverseref.com/canary.pub

Independent verification

Check the signature locally.

Download the statement, signature, and public key into the same folder. With Minisign installed, run:

minisign -Vm canary.txt -p canary.pub

Minisign is available through most package managers, for example brew install minisign, apt install minisign, or winget install minisign.

The current public key ID is CF1A7EE8A78F48F4. The same key is pinned in a DNS TXT record controlled separately from the website deployment.

dig +short TXT _canary.reverseref.com

The DNS result should contain the same key ID and public key as canary.pub. This makes replacement through a website-only compromise easier to detect. It does not protect against compromise of both the website and DNS account.

What to compare

The public key in canary.pub:

RWT0SI+n6H4az2MpZZX5NPP3c6ODoMZsZTmzEM9l7VTBPiorFuJZq+xz

The DNS record should read:

v=minisign1; id=CF1A7EE8A78F48F4; key=RWT0SI+n6H4az2MpZZX5NPP3c6ODoMZsZTmzEM9l7VTBPiorFuJZq+xz

Both values are shown here for convenience. Compare them with what DNS actually returns rather than trusting this page alone.

A successful check confirms that the statement matches the signed file and was signed by the holder of the corresponding private key. It does not independently prove that each statement is true.

Quick integrity check

Compare the file’s checksum.

If you can’t install Minisign, a checksum still tells you whether your copy of the statement matches the one published here. It doesn’t prove who wrote it; only the signature does that.

shasum -a 256 canary.txt

The SHA-256 of the current canary.txt, computed when this page was built:

3404ac3e9523d89a43e7b1e7523d977964b3e1529e858f3afb038900c603db82

What the signature adds

Authenticity, not certainty.

The text can be checked

Changing the signed statement breaks verification. Future canaries should verify against the same published public key.

The limits stay visible

A signature does not prove the claims, prevent legal restrictions, or explain a late update. The date and wording still need to be assessed directly.